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There has long been debate over whether studying mathematics improves one’s logical 
reasoning skills. In fact, it is even unclear whether studying logic improves one’s 
logical reasoning skills. A previous study found no improvement in conditional 
reasoning behaviour in students taking a semester long course in logic. However, the 
reasoning task employed in that study has since been criticised, and may not be a valid 
measure of reasoning. Here, we investigated the development of abstract conditional 
reasoning skills in students taking a course in formal logic, using a more sophisticated 
measure. Students who had previous experience of logic improved significantly, while 
students with no previous experience did not improve. Our results suggest that it is 
possible to teach logical thinking, given a certain degree of exposure. 
INTRODUCTION  
Since the time of Plato (375B.C./2003) it has been assumed that people can be taught 
to think more logically, and in particular, that mathematics is a useful tool for doing 
so. This is known as the Theory of Formal Discipline (TFD) and is exemplified by the 
philosopher John Locke’s suggestion that mathematics ought to be taught to “all those 
who have time and opportunity, not so much to make them mathematicians as to make 
them reasonable creatures” (Locke, 1706/1971, p.20). While there is some evidence 
that studying mathematics does indeed improve logical thinking skills, there is little 
evidence that studying logic itself improves one’s logical thinking. The aim of the 
current study was to investigate the development of logical reasoning skills in 
undergraduate students taking a course in introductory formal logic. Before describing 
our study, we begin by reviewing the evidence that studying mathematics improves 
reasoning skills, then review previous investigations of whether studying logic can 
improve reasoning skills, along with the flaws in these investigations that we aimed to 
remedy.  
The TFD was first tested systematically by Thorndike (1924), who measured children’s 
general reasoning skills before and after one year of schooling. He reported that the 
subjects students studied had only a minimal influence on changes to their test scores. 
French, chemistry and trigonometry were associated with the largest, yet small, 
improvements, while other areas of mathematics (arithmetic, geometry and algebra) 
were associated with improvements close to zero.  
However, Lehman and Nisbett (1990) found evidence that studying mathematics at 
university level was associated with improved conditional reasoning skills. Reasoning 
about conditional ‘if…then’ statements is a central component of logical reasoning 
(Inglis & Simpson, 2008), and fundamental to mathematics (Polya, 1954). Lehman and 
Nisbett tested US undergraduates in their first and fourth years of study on statistical 
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and methodological reasoning, conditional reasoning and verbal reasoning. Across 
their whole sample, which was formed of students from several majors, they found a 
correlation between number of mathematics courses taken and change in conditional 
reasoning behaviour (r = .31). The correlation was even stronger within the natural 
science majors (r = .66). This is a promising finding which suggests that conditional 
reasoning is an aspect of logical thinking that can be developed through mathematics 
education. 
Conditional reasoning development was also investigated by Inglis and Simpson 
(2009), who compared scores in mathematics and non-mathematics undergraduates on 
entry to a UK university. They gave the undergraduates an abstract Conditional 
Inference Task which involved judging the validity of conclusions drawn from abstract 
conditional statements (e.g. If the letter is D then the number is 3; the number is not 3; 
conclusion: the letter is not D). Mathematics undergraduates performed significantly 
better than the comparison undergraduates, even after controlling for between-group 
differences in an intelligence measure. However, over the course of a year, the 
mathematics students improved by only 1.8%, which was not significant.  
In a similar study, Attridge & Inglis (2013) investigated the development of conditional 
reasoning skills in mathematics and non-mathematics A-level students (A-levels are 
two-year post-compulsory courses in the UK, the results of which are used by 
universities to select incoming undergraduates). There was no difference between 
groups in conditional reasoning at the beginning of A-levels, but after one year the 
mathematics students’ reasoning had significantly improved whereas the non-
mathematics students’ reasoning had not.  
While there is evidence that studying mathematics at A-level (Attridge & Inglis, 2013) 
and undergraduate level (Lehman & Nisbett, 1990) is associated with improved 
conditional reasoning skills, there is less evidence that studying logic itself is 
associated with improvements in logical thinking. Next we review two studies that 
investigated this question and came to different conclusions. 
Cheng, Holyoak, Nisbett and Oliver (1986) investigated the development of 
conditional reasoning skills in undergraduates taking a semester-long course in logic. 
The students completed four Wason Selection Tasks (with a mixture of conditional and 
biconditional statements and abstract and thematic content, see Figure 1 for an 
example) at the beginning and end of the course, which contained 40 hours of teaching, 
including the definition of the conditional. It seems reasonable to expect that after such 
training students should be fairly competent at dealing with conditional statements; it 
is difficult to imagine a more promising way to improve a student’s logical thinking 
competency. Nonetheless, there was a non-significant decrease in errors of only 3%.  
However, the lack of improvement that Cheng et al (1986) observed could be due to 
the measure they used. Since their study was conducted it has been suggested that 
Selection Tasks may not actually measure conditional reasoning skills, particularly 
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Figure 1. An example Wason Selection Task similar to those used by Cheng, 
Holyoak, Nisbett and Oliver (1986). 
when the task is presented with a real-world context (Sperber, Cara & Girotto, 1995; 
Sperber & Girotto, 2002). Sperber et al. suggested that Selection Task performance is 
highly influenced by contextual judgments that pre-empt any reasoning. Their account, 
which implies that Selection Tasks do not actually measure reasoning processes, was 
supported across six studies (Sperber et al., 1995; Sperber & Girotto, 2002). Sperber 
and his colleagues showed that success rates in the task can be dramatically 
manipulated by altering the relevance of the content. Success in descriptive versions 
of the task can be increased to over 50%, in line with the success rates usually found 
with obligation-based contextual versions (Sperber et al., 1995).  
Given that their measure may not actually reflect reasoning processes, Cheng et al’s 
(1986) results are difficult to interpret. It may be that their participants did improve in 
logical reasoning, and this simply wasn’t reflected in their measure. This interpretation 
is consistent with a similar study on teaching reasoning, in which White (1936) 
investigated the effect of logic training on 12-year-old boys’ reasoning ability. One 
class spent an hour per week for three months being taught logic, including deduction, 
induction and syllogisms, while another class were not taught any logic. At the end of 
the three months the students were given a reasoning test that included, among other 
things, syllogism validity judgments. The class that had been taught logic scored 
significantly higher on the reasoning test than the control class. The authors concluded, 
conversely to Cheng et al. (1986), that logical thinking can be taught.  
The difference in findings between White (1936) and Cheng et al (1986) may be due 
to the difference in the reasoning measure used, or it may be due to the difference in 
age between the participants in the two studies. Perhaps 12-year-olds’ reasoning skills 
are more malleable than undergraduates’ reasoning skills. To distinguish between these 
possibilities, we investigated reasoning development in undergraduates studying 
As part of your job as quality control inspector at a shirt factory, you have the task 
of checking fabric and washing instruction labels to make sure they are correctly 
paired. Fabric and washing instruction labels are sewn back to back. Your task is to 
make sure that all silk labels have the 'dry clean only' label on the other side.
You must only turn over those labels you need to check to make sure 
the labels are correct.
Machine 
wash in 
warm water
Silk Cotton
Dry clean 
only
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introductory formal logic, using a more sophisticated measure than a Selection Task. 
Undergraduate students completed an abstract conditional inference task (based on 
Attridge and Inglis’ (2013) finding that studying mathematics was associated with 
improvement on an abstract conditional inference task) before and after being 
introduced to truth-functional logic. 
METHOD  
Design 
The study followed a one-group pre-test/post-test design where the intervention was a 
course in logic and the pre-test and post-test was an abstract conditional reasoning task.  
Participants 
Participants (60 males, 19 females) were undergraduate students taking a course on 
logic at a medium-sized private research university in the South-Eastern United States. 
Students came from various majors, including computer science, software engineering, 
mechanical engineering, aerospace engineering, physics, and business. At Time 1, 79 
participants completed the test and of these, 58 also completed it at Time 2. 
Materials 
To measure logical reasoning, we administered the abstract conditional inference task 
(Evans, Clibbens & Rood, 1995). In this task, participants are given a conditional rule 
(e.g. If the letter is M then the number is 5) along with a premise about that rule (e.g. 
The letter is M), followed by a conclusion derived from the rule and premise (e.g. The 
number is 5). The participant then deduces whether the inference to the conclusion is 
necessarily valid or invalid. The task contains 16 items of four inference types: Modus 
Ponens (MP; if p then q, p, therefore q), Denial of the Antecedent (DA; if p then q, not-
p, therefore not-q), Affirmation of the Consequent (AC; if p then q, q, therefore p) and 
Modus Tollens (MT; if p then q, not-q, therefore not-p). The lexical content of the rules 
(letters and numbers) was generated randomly and the order of the problems was 
randomised by participant. The instructions were adapted from Evans et al.  
Logic course 
The course consisted of 37.5 hours of lectures over 15 weeks, covering traditional 
logic, symbolic logic and informal logic. The assessment consisted of 14 pop quizzes, 
two mid-term exams and a final exam. The participants were taught in three groups. 
Procedure 
Participants completed the tests in class at the beginning of the course in early January 
2014, and again at the end of the course in late April 2014. Tests were completed using 
pen and paper under exam-style conditions. 
RESULTS 
Participants were split into two groups depending on whether or not they had previous 
experience with logic. This was determined on the basis of each participant’s degree 
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programme, and whether that programme usually involved a course with some degree 
of logic content prior to the one in question here. As such, this is only a proxy for prior 
logic experience. The prior logic group comprised students majoring in Computer 
Science, Software Engineering, or Electrical Engineering, all of whom should have 
taken Digital Logic or Discrete Mathematics before they take Logic. This allowed us 
to investigate the role of previous exposure to logic in any development found. One 
participant was removed on the basis of being an outlier in terms of change over time 
(scoring 16/16 at Time 1 and 5/16 at Time 2). The remaining 57 participants’ data were 
subjected to a 2 (Time: pre-test, post-test) u 4 (Inference: MP, DA, AC, MT) u 2 (Prior 
Logic: yes, no) mixed ANOVA.  
This revealed a main effect of inference, F(3,165) = 41.31, p < .001, ηp2 = .429, where 
accuracy was higher on MP inferences than on all other inferences, all ps < .001, a 
main effect of Time F(1,55) = 6.78, p = .012, ηp2 = .110, with higher accuracy at Time 
2 (M = 2.70, SD = 0.79) than at Time 1 (M = 2.54, SD = 0.63), and no main effect of 
Prior Logic, F(1,55) = 1.77, p = .188, ηp2 = .031. However, there was a significant 
interaction between Time and Prior Logic, F(1,55) = 4.32, p = .042, ηp2 = .073 (see 
Figure 2). An independent samples t-test showed no difference in Time 1 scores 
between participants with (M = 2.54, SD = 0.61) and without (M = 2.48, SD = 0.58) 
prior logic experience, t(55) = .37, p = .716, d = 0.1. However, paired samples t-tests 
showed that in the students presumed to have studied logic previously, scores 
significantly improved between Time 1 (M = 2.54, SD = 0.61) and Time 2 (M = 2.91, 
SD = 0.87), t(32) = 3.27, p = .003, d = 0.49, while in the students who had not studied 
logic previously, scores did not significantly improve between Time 1 (M = 2.48, SD 
= 0.58) and Time 2 (M = 2.52, SD = 0.63), t(23) = .41, p = .682, d = .07. Despite this, 
the difference between groups at Time 2 was only marginally significant, t(55) = 1.97, 
p = .054, d = 0.53. All other interactions were non-significant. 
 
 Average Time 1 Time 2 Absolute 
change 
Percentage 
change 
MP 3.85(0.35) 3.77 (0.63) 3.93 (0.26) +0.16 (0.65) +4.24 
DA 2.26 (0.98) 2.12 (1.46) 2.40 (1.47) +0.28 (1.36) +13.21 
AC 1.98 (1.43) 1.91 (1.61) 2.05 (1.57) +0.14 (1.38) +7.33 
MT 2.42 (0.87) 2.25 (1.30) 2.60 (1.22) +0.35 (1.84) +15.56 
Table 1. Mean Conditional Inference Scores split by Time and Inference. Standard 
deviations in parentheses. 
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Figure 2. Interaction between Time and Prior Logic on Conditional Inference Scores. 
Error bars reflect r1 standard error of the mean. 
DISCUSSION 
We investigated the development of conditional reasoning skills in undergraduates 
taking a course in logic. Overall, our results suggest that studying formal logic 
improves students’ ability to deal with conditional statements, but only if they have 
had some experience with logic previously. While conditional inference scores did 
improve over time for the whole sample, when we examined the role of previous 
experience with logic, it became apparent that only those who had studied logic 
previously actually showed any gains in reasoning skills during the course. For those 
students who had not studied logic before, there was not a significant improvement in 
conditional inference scores over time. Interestingly, the students who had taken a logic 
course previously did not outperform those who had not at Time 1. This suggests that 
the amount of logic training the students had received previously was not sufficient to 
give them an advantage on our conditional inference task, but that it was sufficient to 
make the logic course in question more effective. 
Our findings suggest that it is possible to teach logical thinking, but that a certain level 
of exposure may be necessary before students’ skills begin to develop. We do not have 
data on the number of hours of previous study that participants had, but the fact that 
students without prior experience did not improve during the 37.5 hours of lectures 
involved in the current course suggests that a greater number of hours is required for 
development. Future research should systematically investigate the number of hours of 
exposure necessary for students’ logical reasoning skills to improve. 
It is interesting to note that the improvement we saw in conditional reasoning did not 
differ between the four inference types (MP, DA, AC and MT). Attridge and Inglis 
(2013) found that studying A level mathematics was associated with improved 
performance with the invalid inferences (DA and AC), and with worse performance on 
the MT inferences. In the present study, students improved to a similar extent on all of 
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the inferences, which, perhaps unsurprisingly, suggests that teaching students logic is 
a more effective way to improve their logical thinking than teaching them mathematics. 
Nevertheless, if we compare the effect sizes for the increase in the number of correct 
responses, over all inference types, in each of these studies, the A level mathematics 
students’ improvement (d = .49) was of a similar magnitude to that of the logic students 
who had some prior exposure to logic (d = .49) and larger than in the full logic class 
sample (d = .34). This was despite the mathematics students having no previous 
experience with logic and not receiving any explicit logic tuition during their A level. 
On the other hand, the mathematics course lasted for a full academic year, as opposed 
to one semester for the logic course. Although the two courses are not comparable in 
terms of length or student age and experience, the fact that learning mathematics 
appears to develop one’s logical reasoning skills to a similar extent to studying formal 
logic is very promising for proponents of the TFD. 
Our results contradict those of Cheng et al (1986) who found that a semester long 
course in logic was not associated with any improvements in students’ reasoning 
performance. We suggested that the measure Cheng et al used, four selection tasks, 
was not an appropriate measure of reasoning, and that this may be why they failed to 
find an effect of tuition. Our results support this interpretation: using a more 
sophisticated measure of conditional reasoning we found that a similar intervention 
resulted in significant improvement.  
One limitation of our study is that we did not compare the logic students to a control 
group. This means that we cannot rule out the possibility that our participants would 
have improved even without taking the logic course. However, this alternative 
interpretation seems unlikely. First, the improvement was only seen in the subset of 
students with prior exposure to logic. If there were a general developmental trend in 
reasoning skills in the undergraduate population then we would expect to see this 
development across the whole sample. Second, Attridge (2013) did not observe any 
development in conditional reasoning skills in a sample of psychology undergraduates, 
and Inglis and Simpson (2009) did not observe any improvement in undergraduate 
mathematics students. Again, if the development we observed here were due to a 
general developmental trend, as opposed to the logic course, we would expect to have 
seen improvements in both of these groups.  
Another limitation is that we did not directly measure prior logic experience; we used 
each participant’s major as a proxy for whether or not they were likely to have taken a 
course with some logic content previously. This means that a few students in each 
group could have been miscategorised. Since we split participants by major, there is 
also the possibility that participants in the prior logic and non-prior logic groups may 
have varied on SAT scores or another unmeasured variable. However, there was an 
overall effect of time on conditional inference scores, averaging over both groups, so 
these issues should not be a major cause for concern. Rather, the effect of prior logic 
experience should be confirmed in future studies where potential confounding 
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variables are controlled for, and if it transpires that a factor such as SAT scores is 
responsible for the group difference, then this in itself would be an interesting finding. 
In conclusion, our findings suggest that, contrary to previous research, it is possible to 
improve students’ logical reasoning through instruction. Nevertheless, the level of 
improvement we found was comparable to that seen in A level mathematics students, 
who received no explicit logic tuition. This is promising for proponents of the TFD, 
which suggests that teaching mathematics is an effective method for developing 
students’ logical thinking skills.  
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